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4 One of the main elements of the community,s policy of redueing the
vurnerability of its energy supply is based on diversification of
sources. Gas from the Soviet Ljnion will help to conserve the
communityts own stock of gas, oi1 and other fuels, and will reduce the
Cornmunityts reliance on other foreign sources. Use of Siberian gas
will not create a dangerous dependence on that source. Even when gas
is fl0wing at the maximum rate, in lgg0, it will represent less than
4 per cent of the Communityrs total energy consumpEion.
whatever the effects on the soviet union, the effects on European
community interests of the u.s. measures, applied retroactiucly
and without sufficient consultation, are unquestionabr-y and seriously
damaging. Many companies interested as sub-coqtractcrs, or
suppliers of components, have made investments and committe,J producEive
capacities Eo the pipeline project, well before the American measures
were taken' Though they rnay use no American technology, they will
suffer complete loss of business if the European contribution to the
project is blocked. some of these companies may not survive. Major
European companies that can survive the immediate loss of business,
will nevertheless suffer from lower levels of capacity utilization
and loss of production and profits. while workers will be raid off
temporarily or permanently.
rn the longer term, European comrnunity companies may be damaged by
the disruption of their contracts concluded in good faith, becauce they
may cease to be reliable suppLiers in the eyes not only of the soviet
union, but also of their actual and potential business parEners in
other countries. One inevitable consequencewouldbe to call in
question the usefulness of technological links between European and
American firms, if contracts could be nullified at any t,ime by decision
of the U.S. AdminisEration. Another consequence to be feared is that.
the claim of u.s. jurisdiction accompanying u.S. investment wilI
create a resistance abroad to the flow of u.S. investment. Thus,
these export conErol measures run counter to the policy aims of the
United states of gasing the transfer of technology and of encouraging
free trade in general. There will be other far-reaching effects
upon business confidence. These measures thus add to the clim.rte of
uncertainty that is already pervading the world economy as a whole.
The European Comnnunity cherefore calls upon the United St.ates Authorities
to wichdraw these measures.
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With reference to Ehe interim Rules promulgated on 22 June 1982 by the
Department of cormerce under the Export Administration Act of 1979,
and to the communityts noEe presented on 14 July 1982, the European
Community wishes to present further Comment,s on the new Export
Administration Ru1es, with the request that Ehis note and these
comments be transmitted to the -Department of Comnerce in accordance
with that Departmentts invitation for public commenEs to be made by 2l
August 1982.
The European Community wishes to draw attention to the importance that
it aitaches Eo the legal, political and economic aspects of the United
StaEest measures, including their impact on the commercial policy of
Ehe Community. As to the legal aspects, the European Community
considers the U.S. measures contrary to international law, and
apparently at variance with rules and principles laid down in U.S.
law.
As to the political and economic aspects, it is clear that the U.S.
measures are 1iable to affect a wide variety of business activiEies,
while their primary purpose is to delay the construction of the
pipeline to bring Soviet gas to l^lestern Europe. The European
Community holds that it is unlikely that the U.S. measures will in
fact delay materially the construction of the pipeline or the delivery
of the gas.
The 
.pipeline from Siberia to WesEern Europe can be compleEed using
Soviet technology and production capacity diverted from other parts of
their current programme. Furthenuore the recent U.S. measures provide
Ehe Soviets with a strong inducement to enlarge their ovrn manufacturing
capacity and to accelerate their own turbine and compressor developtrents,
Ehus becoming independent of Western sources. Gas could sEill flow to
the Community starting as scheduled in 1984 owing Eo the existence of
subsEantial spare capacity in the existing pipeline sysEetr, sufficient
to cover the requirements of the early phase\of the programme of
deliveries.
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3Finally, no person in Ehe U.S. or in a foreign country ma y export or
re-exPort Eo lhe U.S.S.R. foreign products direcily derived from U.S.
technical data (l) relating to machinery etc. utiliz-ed for the
exploration, production or transmission or refinement of petroleum or
natural gas or commodities produced in planEs based on such U.S.
Eechnical data.
This prohibition applies in three alternative situations, namely:
if a writt,en assurance was required under the U.S. exPort
regulations when the data were exPorted;
if any person subject to the jurisdiction of Ehe U.S.A. (as
defined in note (2) receives royalties or other comPensaEion for,
or has licensed, the use of the technical data concerned,
regardless of when the data were exporEed from the U.S.;
if the recipienE of Che U.S. technical daEa has agreed (in the
licensing agreement or other cont,racEs) to abide by U.S. exPort
conlro1 regulations.
,
The following comments will discuss firstly Ehe inEernational legal
aspecEs of the US measures, including (a) the generally recognized
bases on which jurisdiction can be founded in internaEional law and
(b) orher bases of jurisdiction which mighc be invoked by the U.S.
GovernmenE; secondl the rules and principles as laid down in U.S.
law, in particular the Export Administration Act, and as applied by
U.S. Courts, which would seem Eo be at variance with the Amendments of
June 22 , 1982,
This expression is very broadly defined in l5 CFR para. 379.1.
Now defined as (i) gny person t.rherever located who is a ciEizen or
resident of the United SEates' (ii) any Person actually within che
UniCed Stat,es; (iii) any corporaEion organized under Ehe laws of the
United Stages or of any State, Territory, Possession or DisCrict of
Ehe United SEates; or 1ir) any partnership, association, corporation
or other organizat.ion, wher",rlr organized or doing business ' 9!r1t is
oumed o, co.,ttolleci by persons specified in paragraphs (i)' (ii) or(iii).
(l)
(2)
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COI,IMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE A},IENDMENTS
OF 22 JUNE I982 TO THE US EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Qn'June 22, 1982, the Department of Commerce at the direction of
President Reagan and pursuant t,o Section 6 of the Export AdminisEration
AcE amended Sections 376.12, 379.8 and 385.2 of Ehe Export Administration
Regularions. These amendments amounted to an expansion of the
existing US controls on t,he export and re-export of goods and
technical data relating to oil and gas exploration, exploiEation,
lransmission and ref inement..
The European Comrunity believes that the US regulations as amended
contain sweeping extensions of US jurisdiction which are unlawful
under international law. Moreover, the new Regulations and the way in
which they affecE contracts in course of performance seems to''run
counter to criteria of the Export AdminisEraEion AcE and also to
certain principles of U.S. public law.
2. The main thrust, of the Regulations tray be summarized as follows:
First of all, persons within a third counlry may noe re-exPort
machinery for the exploration, production, transmission or refinemenE
of oiL and natural gas, or components thereof, if it is of U.S.
origin, wit,hout, permission of the U.S. Government.
Moreoverr any person subjecE to the jurisdiction of the United
States (l) is required to get prior writEen authorization by Ehe
Office of Export Administration for export or re-exPorE to the
U.S.S.R. of non-US goods and technical data related to oi1 and gas
exploration, production, transmission and refinement.
(l) Now defined as (i) eny person wherever locaEed who is a ciEizen or
residenc of the United States; (ii) any person actually within the
United States; (iii) any corporacion organized under Ehe laws of the
Unired SEates; or (iv) any partnership, association, corporation or
other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is
ovn:ed or concrolled by persons specified in paragraphs (i), (ii) or(iii).
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II. THE AMENDMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAI^I
A gelsrcllv-eeeeP!sq-!c:e9-e!-igri sdicEion in internati^onal- 1aw
The U.S. measures as they apply in the Present case are unaccepEable
under inEernational 1aw because of their extra-territorial aspect.s.
They seek to regulaEe companies not of U.S. nat,ionality in respect of
their conduct outside the United States and particularly the handling
of property and technical data of these companies not within Ehe
United SEates.
They seek Eo impose on non-US companies Ehe resEriction of U.S: lawby
Ehreatening them with discriminatory sancEions in the field of trade
which are inconsisEent with the normal commercial practice established
between the U.S. and the E.C.
In this way the Amendments of June 22, 1982, run counter to the two
generally accepted bases of jurisdiction in international law; the
territorialiEy and Ehe nationality principles (l).
5. The territorialitY Principle (i.e. the notion that a state should
restrict ifs rule-making in principle to Persons and goods within its
Eerritory and that-an organization like the European Comunity should
resEricE the applicability of its rules to the terriEory to which the
Treaty setting it up applies) is a fundamental notion of inEernational
law, in particular insofar as it, concerns the regulagion of the social
and economic act,ivity in a state. The principle that each state - and
mutatis mutandis Ehe Comslunity insofar as Powers have been transferred
to it - has the right freely to organize and develop its social and
economic sysEem has been confirmed many times in international fora'
The American measures clearly infringe the principle of territoriality,
since they purporE to regulate the activities of companies in the
E.C., not under the terriEorial compeEence of the U'S'
6. The nationality pr inciple (i.e. Ehe preseription of rules for
nat.ionals, wherever they are) cannot serve as a basis for Ehe
exEension of u.S. jurisdiction resulting from the Amendments, i.e.
(i) over companies incorporated in E.c. Member StaEes on Ehe basis of
some corporaEe link (parent,-subsidiary) or personal link (e'g'
shareholding) Eo the U.S.; (ii) over companies incorporaced in E'C'
Member sEates, either because they have a tie to a u.s.-incorporated
see Resratement (2nd) of the Foreign Relations Law of the u's' (1972)'
paras. l7 and 30 resPectivelY.
4
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9 The Amendments of 22 June 1982, therefore, cannot re justified under
the nationality principle, because they ignore the two traditional'
criteria for determining the nationality of companies reconfirmed by
the rnternat,ional court, of Justice and because they purport to give
some noEion of "nationality" to goods and technologies so as to
establish jurisdiction over persons handling them.
The purported direcE extension of U.S.jurisdiction to non-US incorporaEed
companies not using U.S. origin technology or component,s is a fortiori
objectionabte to the E.c., because neither of these (in themselves
invalid) justifications could apply
10. The last mentioned case exemplifies to what exEent the wholesale
infringement of Ehe nationality principle exacerbates the infringement
of the territoriality principle (l). Thus even E.c. incorporated
companies in the example mentioned above according to the Amendments
would have to ask special written permission not of the E.c, but of
the U.S. auEhorities in order to obEain permission to export goods
produced in the E.C. and based on E.C. technology from the territory
to which the E.C. Treaties apply to the U.S.S.R. The practical impacc
of the AmendmenEs to the Export Administration Regulations'is that
E.C. companies are pressed into service to carry out U.S. trade policy
towards the U.S.S.R., even Ehough these companies are incorporated and
have their registered office within the Community which has its own
trade policy towards the U.S.S.R.
The public policy ("ordre public") of the European Community and of
iEs Member States is thus purportedly replaced by U.S. public policy
which European companies are forced to carry out within the E.C., if
they are not Eo tose export privileges in the U.S. or to face oEher
sanctions. This is an unacceptable interference in the affairs of the
European Cornmunity.
Il. Furthermore, it is reprehensible that present U.S. Regulations
encourage non-Us companies to submit I'voluntarily" to this kind of
mobilization for U.S. purposes.
The appl at 10n of the nationality principle would imply ipso facto
some overlapping wi th the application of the rerritorialicy principle
and this is acceptable under international Iaw, in some instances, but
we are not. in such a situation in this case.
r:..
713. However, it is clear ab initio that the exEension of U.S. j urisdiction
implicit in the Arnendments cannot be based on the principles mentioned
under l2(a) or (b).
The "proEective principle" has not, been invoked by the U.S. GovernmenE,
since the Amendments are based on SecEion 6 (Foreign Policy Controls)
and not on Section 5 (National SecuriEy Controls) of the Export
Administration Act. The U.S. Government itself, therefore, has no!
sought. to base the Amendments on considerations of national security.
The "effects docErine" is noE applicable. It cannot conceivably be
argued that exports from the European Comrnunity to the iJ.S.S.R. for
the Siberian gas pipeline have within Ehe U.S.A. direct, foreseeable
and substantial effects which are not merely undesirable, but which
const,itut.e an element, of a crime or t-ort proscribed by U.S. Iaw. It is
more Ehan like1y that. Ehey have no direct effects on U.S. trade.
14. For the reasons expounded above, i-t is clear that the U.S. measures of
June 22, 1982 do not find a valid basis in any of the generally
recognized - or even the more controversial - principles of ihternational
law governing state jurisdicEion to prescribe ruIes. As a matter of
fact the measures by their extra-territorial characEer simultaneously
infringe the territoriality and nationality principles of jurisdiction
and are Eherefore unlawful under international law.
III. THE AMENDI"IENTS UNDER U.S. LAW
A. U.S. Reactions to measures similar to the June 22 Amendments
15. If a.foreign country were to take measures like t,he June 22 Amendments'
it is doubtful whether they would be in conformity with U.S. 1aw and
Ehey would therefore probably not be recognized and enforced by U.S.
courts.
The kind of mobilization of E.C. companies for U.S. purposes Eo which
the Community objects was subject to strong American reacEions and
legislative count.er-measures, when U.S. companies were similarly
mobilized for the foreign policy purposes of oEher states.
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Even when submiision Eo a foreign boycott is entirely voiunt.ary, such
submission within the U.S. has been considered tc be undesirable and
conErary to U-S. public policy (l). By the same token it must have
been evident to the U.S. Government that Ehe statuto-ry encouragemenE
of voluntary submission to U.S. public policy in trade matters ruithin
the E.c. is strongly condemned by the European community. privaEe
agreemenEs should noE be used in ttris way as instrumenEs of foreign
policy. If a GovernmenE in law and in fact systematically encourages
the inclusion of such submission clauses in private contracts the
freedom of contract is misused in order to circumvent the limits
imposed on national jurisdiction by international law.
IE is self-evident, moreover, Ehat Ehe existence of such submission
clauses in cerEain private contracts cannot serve as a basis for u.s.
r-egulatory jurisdiction which can properly be exercised solely
in conformicy with international law. Nor can a company DrevenE a
staEe from objecting Eo any infringement which might oceur of the
jurisdicrion of the srate to which it belongs.
B. 0ther bases_of_j urisdiction
12. There are two other bases of jurisdiction which might be invoked by
the U.S. Government, but which have found less than general aeceptance
under international 1aw. These are:
a) the protecEive principle (para. 33 of the 2nd Restatement), r.;hich
would give a stace jurisdiction to proscribe acts done outside
its territory but threatening its security or the operation of
it.s governmental functions, if such acts are generally recognized
as crimes by SEaEes with reasonably developed 1ega1 systems;
b)' ,the so-ca11ed t'ef fects doctrine", under which conduct oc.cu::riog..,
outside the terrirory but causing direct,.foreseeable and
substant,ial effects - which are al.so constituenE elements of a
crime or tort 
- within the territory may be proscribed (para. l8
of the 2nd Restat,emenr) .
(l) Cf. Section 8 of the ExporE Administration Acr and below underII.A.
This being rhe reacrion of the u.s. regisrator and judiciary to
foreign measures comparable to its own measures of June 22, the u.s.
Goverrunent should not have inflicted these measures on the E.c.
companies concerned in the virtual knowledge 
.thai these measures would
be regarded as unlawfur and ineffective by pubric auchorities in the
E. C.
B' gelIligg:-gl-igri:giggrelgl{-4gqeqqodarion or rnreresr
17 ' rn cases where the conflicting exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe.
leads to conflicts of enforcement jurisdiction between states, each
state, according to para. 40 0f the Restatement (2nd) Foreign
Relations Law of the u.s., is required by international law to
consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcemenEjurisdicrion. rn this connecrion Ehe following factors should be
cons idered :
'"a) vital national interests of each of the states;
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsisEent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person;
c) the extent to which the required cond,uct is to take place in the
territory of lne oEher sr,ate;
d) the nationality of the other person ...,,.
18. Over the past years various u.s. courts of Appeal have pronounced
themselves in favour of this "balancing of interests', approach.
rn the case of the Timberlane co. v. Bank of America (l) Judge choy
suggested that comity demanded an evaluation and balancing of relevant,
facEors, and continued: "The elements to be weighed include the degree
of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or arlegiance
of the parties, and the locations or principal places of businesses or
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either staEe can be
expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects
on the United states as compared with those ersewhere, the extent. to
which there is expliciE purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
the foreseeability of such effect, and the relaEive imporEance to the
violations charged of cond,ucr within the united States as compared
wiEh conduct, abroad".
(l) Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, lg77-l Trade cases No. 61.233.
The anti-foreigh-boycoEt provisions of Section B of the ExporE
Administration Act are EesEimony to that. In the same way as the U'S'
could not accept Ehat its companies were t.urned inco instruments of
the foreign policy of other nations, the E.C. cannog accepE EhaE iEs
companies must follow another t.rade policy t.han its o'wn wiChin iEs own
territorial jurisdiction
It is noteworthy that Ehe anti-boycott provisions of the Export
AdministraEion Act can be invoked in response to a boycoEt that
takes a less direct form Ehan the June 22 Amendments, namely a boycott
which merely tries Eo clissuade persons from dealing with a third
country by refusing to trade with such Persons. An exPort resEricEion
pa!terned on the June 22 AmendmenEs, in contrast, would directly
prohibit a. person from dealing with a Particular country under the
threat of government-imposed penalties. Therefore, the latesE
AmendmenEs would appear to be even more far-reaching than a ooycoEt
which mighr give rise to the application of the anti-boycott provisions.
16. Even if for some reason the foreign boycott provisions of Ehe ExporE
Administrati'on Act were not considered applicable, a foreign country
imposing such restrictions as those imposed by the June 22 Amendments
would probably be viewed by U.S. CourEs as atEemPting to exEend its
laws beyond its Eerritory without sufficient nexus with the U.S.
entity to justify such an exEension. This certainly would be the case
with respect Eo a mere licensee of a foreign concern.
If a foreign government complained thaE a U.S. licensee of a foreign
company was not complying lrith that foreign governmentrs export
restrictions prohibiting such exports, a U.S. federal court, would
decline jurisdiction, because U.S. CourEs will not enforce foreign
penal staEutes (l).
If the observance of a foreign export control-by a U.S. subsidiary or
licensee were Eo become an issue in 1i'igation between the lacrer and
its foreign parent company or licensor, a federal or staEe court would
probably not refuse jurisdiction, but would decline to enforce Ehe
export restrictions of Ehe foreign counEry on the grounds that it
would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum and noE in
the interest of the United States to do so (2).
\r..
Res tatemenE
(2) RestatemenE
l.:i,:-.r- -,:':":-?r:,' Cc:panv, 127 US. 265, 290 ( l8B8) ;(2nd) Conflict of Laws Para. 89.
(2nd) Conflict of Laws pp. 90.
It does away wirh the rather a;tificial distinctic:: between the right
to assert a jurisdiction to prescribe and resErainr. in exercising it.
rt simply considers Ehat the exercise of a jurisdiccion Eo prescribe
may be unreasonable; to decide whether this is so or not draftpara. 403 (l) enjoins the evaluation of such factors as prace of the
activity to be regulated, rinks of persons farling under the reguration
with other states, consistency with the traditions of the internaEional
system, interests of oEher states in regulating the activiry concerned,
and the existence of justified expectations to be affecEed by the
regulation.
23' whatever approach is adopted by the u.s. Government in balancing u.s.
interests against the interests of the European community, the
following considerat,ions have been neglected.
The interest of the European community in regulating the foreign
trade of the nationals of the Me-mber states in the territory to
which the community Treaties appry is paramount over any foreign
policy purposes that a third country may have.
- The conduct required by the Amendments is to take place rargely
in territory ro which the E.c. Treaties apply and not in,u.s.
terri tory.
- The nationality and other ties of many persons whose conduct is
purportedly regulated by the June 22 Amendments link them
primarily to E.C. Member States and not to the U.S.
- There are justified expectations on the part of E.c. eompanies
which are seriously hurt by the U.S. measures.
c 9rr!er!e-sEqer_!,se!]eE_Oe)._eE_gle_grpert Administration Act
24' rt can hardly be claimed that the u.s. measures saEisfy the criteria
laid down in the Export Administration Act, and therefore it is
doubtful whether the restrictions are properly applied in terms of
u'S' law. criterion I refers to the probability that Ehe controls
will achieve Ehe intended foreign policy purposes. Soviet Authorities
have clearly staEed their intention to deliver gas to lrresEern Europe
as scheduled, and there is little reason to doubt rheir ability to do
so, even without American or European equipment since Ehe existing
Soviet pipeline system already has sufficient spare capacicy, at leasE
Ciced in Harold G. I'IAIER, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads:
an Intersection beEween PubIic and Private International Law, 76 AmericanJournal of Internarional Law lggl,2gO, at 300-301.
( l)
A similar approach was followed in Manningron Mills (t) and is seE our
in paragraph 40 of the Second ResEatement
19. Although this "balancing of interesE" approach applies in the first
place Eo courts, there are good reasons why the U.S. Government should
exercise such restraint already at the rule-making st.age.
20' First, Section 6 of the Export Administration Act in severar places
enjoins the President to consider the position of other countries
before taking or extending export controls.
Thus para. (b): "... the president'shall consider:
other countries to the imposition or expansion of
by the United States".
t:
(3) the reaction of
exporC cont.rols
:-
rn para. (d) : "... the president shalr determine thaE reasonable
efforEs have been made to achieve the purposes of Ehe conErols through
negotiaEions or oEher alternative means',.
Finally in para. (g): "... the president shall take aLl feasible sEeps
to initiaEe and conclude negotiations for the purpose of securing'the
cooperation of such foreign goverrunents in controlling the export, to
countries and consignees Eo which the u.S. export controls apply of
any goods or technology comparable Eo goods or technology cont.rolled
under this section".
21. In the second place, these .dnendments to the Export Administration
Regulations may not be subject to substantive judicial review. This
means that u.s. courts may not be able to apply their barancing of
inEerests approach in a clash of enforcement_.jurisdictions. It is
Eherefore appropriate for the executive to apply it at the rule-making
s tage
22' Finally, the direction in which informeo legal opinion in the U.S. is
moving on this issue is demonstrated by the new draft RestaEement(3rd) of the Foreign Relarions Law of Ehe U.S.
(l) ManningEon Mills Inc. v Congoleum Corp. 1979-l Trade Cases No.62.547.
to cover the requirements of the early phases of the programme of
deliveries. If the pipeline is buiIE wirh soviet rechnorogy ,nd Ehe
gas 
-E1ows on time, these u.s. export controls are at, besE ineffectual,
and may well be self-defeating, as instruments of foieign policy.
25. Criterion 3 requires that the reaction of other counEries to the
imposition or exPansion of such export controls be taken inEo account.
In view of the extra-territorial application, and retroactive effect
of the U.S. measures, the European Comrnunity cannoE fail to denounce
Ehe measure as unlawful under international law; and in view of their
damaging economic and political consequences, has already protested in
the strongest terms.
26. Criterion 4 require.s consideration of the effects of the proposed
conErols on the export performance of the United States. Here again,
confirmaEion of the U.S. measures despite criterion 4 would involve
compleEe disregard for damaging effect,s noE only immediately, buE also
in the longer Eerm' owing to the grave doubts that are bound to arise
in future abouE the u.s. as a reliable supplier of equipment under
contract' or as a reliable partner in technology-licensing arrangements.
This danger has already been pointed ouE to the president of the':
United Stat,es by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
D Compensation for damaqe resultins
_ __ _ __ _:=:_:=-i_ from U.S. measures
27- The U.S. measures inasmuch as they refer to exports from countries
out,side the u.s. are all the more objectionable, as they affect
contracts that were free from restrictions imposed by the u.s.
Authorities at che time of their conclusion.
The main contractors of the Siberian pipeline, a number of major sub-con-
tractors and suppliers as well as other exporters, will suffer r..
substantial economic and financial losses for irhictr no compensation is
provided. Fof many sub-contractors who for Ehe most. parE have nothing
to do with American goods or technology for gas transporE, the
pract.icat consequences of the Amendments will be particularly severe
and may actually force them out of business. Lay-offs of a considerable
number of workers will result in any case from Ehe Amendments.
idba that compensaEion is due in case private pro:erty or existing
contraccs are seriously affectec by government action is also familiarin che U'S' 
-regal system. rf u.s. Governrnent takes privaEe proper.y
by eminent domain it has to compensaEe the owner. The supreme courthas indicated many times that if regulatory legisration virrually
deprives a person of the complete use and enjoyment of his property
Ehe law of eminent domain applies (l).
Justice Brandeis has writren: "rt is true that the police power
embraces regurations ciesigned tc promote public convenience or the.general welfare But when particular individuals are singled outto bear the cost of advancing the pubric convenience, that imposition
must bear some reasonable relaEion to the evils to be eradicated orthe advant,ages to be secured" (2). It is self-evident that for
European cont.ractors and sub-cont.ractors within the E.c. .he cosEirrposed upon them by the Amendment,s does not bear a reasonable
relation .o .he advantage of furthering American export policy.
This lack of provision for compensation or protection is all the moredisconcert.ing, because the funendments of June 22 purport Eo regurate
not merely U.S. external t,rade (3), but E.C. external trade as'welI.
Moreover, these 
"." "orr"iderations which obviously have play.i 
" 
,or"in the imposition of foreign trade embargoes in Ehe past. Firstry, both rhe
cuban Assets control Regulations (1981) and the rranian Assets controlRegulations (1979) exempted to a large extent foreign incorporatedfirms with ties to U.s. firms from otherwise stringent or even
absolute trade prohibitions (4). Secondly, both the trade embargo
connected with the rranian hostage crisis and the embargo on grain
shipmenEs to the u.s.s.R. permitted existing contracts to be honoured.
(l) 
T?iiril"'nt1v in Goldblatt v. rown of Hempsread, 369 us 590, sg4
(2)
(3)
Nashville C. and Sr. L. Ry v. WalEers, 2g4 US 405, 4Zg (1935).
BuEtfield v. Stranahan, 192 us 470, 4g3 (r904) indicates thar insofaras iE concerns u's. exEernal trade it may be difficult to assert FifEhAmendment rights.
This is not Eo say that the E.c. agrees in principle to the way inwhich these Regulations handle ir,"-p.outem or 
"*a."-r".ritoriality.
28. The
II
29.
(4)
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COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
AIDE-MEI'IOIRE l1clt'"ft:
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The European Community and its Member States have the
honour to present to the U.S. administration the following
Aide-Memoire concerning the Export Administration Act of 1979.
1. The considerations set out below pertain to the way this
Act affects companies doing business in the Commr:nity and in
particular to the claims, implicit both in ttre Act itself and in
the way it has been interpreted by the U.S. Adrninistration, that
U.S. jurisdiction r:nder the Act extends to persons doing business
in the Commr:nitY. '
2. The E>rport Administration Act contains such phrases as "any
person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" which
has consistently been defined so as to include companies incor-
porated, having their registerecl office or doing business in
foreign countries and owned or controlled by U.S. natural or
legal persons. Moreover, the Act itself defines a 'U.S. person'
so that those words inclu& foreign sr:bsidiaries or affiliates of
U.S. domestic concerns which are 'controlled in fact" by those
concerns. As regards the Administrationrs interpretation of the
Act, this has consistently been such as to include within'goods",
technology or other information subject to the jurisdiction of
0IV. CONCLUSION
30. The European Community considers that the Amendments to the Export
Administration Regulations of June 22 l9B2 are unlawiul since they
cannot be validly based on any of the generally accepted bases ofjurisdiction in int.ernational law. Moreover, insofar as these
Amendments tend to enlist, companies whose main ties are to the E.C.
Member SEates for purposes of American Erade policy vis-i-vis the
u.s.s.R., they constitute an unacceptable interierence in the
independent commercial poricy of the E.c. comparable measures by
third states have been rejected by the U.S. in the pasE.
31. Even from thi standpoinE of U.S. 1aw, the European CommuniEy considers
that the United States has not adopced a proper "balance of interests"
approach. The European Community further considers that the AmendmenEs
t." oi doubtful validity under the criteria of the Exoort Administrarion
Act of 1979.
32 For Ehese reasons, the European Community cal1s upon the U.S.
Authorities !o withdraw these measures.
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Steel
U.S., EC REACH AGREEMENT ON ACCORD EXTENSION'
SEMIFINISHED LEVEL STILL REMAlNS UNRESOLVED
Administration action against steel imports from the Eu-
ropean Community was temporarily averted at the last
minute when the two sides Oct. 31 reached agreement on an
extension of the U.S.-EC steel arrangements.
The deal, announced by U.S. Trade Representative Clay-
ton Yeutter just hours following the deadline, provides for
the restraint of European exports of all finished steel pro-
ducts to roughly 5.5 percent of U.S. consumption. This level
marks a significant reduction from the 6.6 percent level for
these goods prevailing through the first nine months of 1985,
USTR reported. However, the new total is also slightly more
than the 5.46 percent level agreed upon in 1982, and includes
slight increases in EC shipments of consultation goods,
according to a Community spokesman.
No Agreement On Semilinished
However, the two sides were unable to settle on a figure
for semifinished steel-the chief stumbling block in reach-
ing agreement. Yeutter stated that current arrangement
coverage for semifinished steel would be extended, and the
goods will remain as consultation products. However, the
Administration has been pressing to include the products in
the text of the accord and to assign them a specific quota
level, and it is expected that the two sides will have to
conduct further talks in light of the Administration's inten-
tions to hold overall imports of semifinished steel to 1.7
million tons annually.
Reports from Brussels said the United States may hold
the EC to anywhere from 400,000 to 500,000 tons of imports
of semifinished next year if the two sides cannot reach
agreement soon on this issue, but a USTR official said the
matter was still under consideration.
Allocations For Other Products
The two sides were able, however, to work out separate
allocations for 33 product categories, including each of the
11 complementary product categories established in August,
the original 10 licensed products, pipe and tube, and oil
country tubular goods, USTR said. Moreover, several new
products were added to the accord which were not covered
by the first arrangement, including wire rope, wire strand,
stainless steel, strip and wire, and fabricated structural
steel. The agreement will be in effect from Jan. 1, 1986,
through Sept. 30, 1989, and will cover more than $2.5 billion
worth of EC steel exports to this country.
Stainless steel has been a particularly sensitive matter
because it is the subject of an import relief program that
was put into effect by the Administration pursuant to Sec-
tion 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. An EC spokesman said the
two sides have agreed on a quota figure for stainless, but
said it will not go into effect until the safeguard measures
have been removed by the United States.
The two sides appeared to be heading toward a showdown
earlier in the week when they failed to resolve their dis-
agreement over semifinished steel trade' More pressure was
added Oct. 30 when Yeutter announced that the Community
ql/,e00
News Highlights 'q
would not be allowed to send any more shipments of certain
categories of steel to the United States through the end of
the year-notably the consultation products-if a deal was
not reached by the Oct. 31 deadline. In announcing this step,
Yeutter appeared to be indicating that shipments of these
goods had exceeded quota levels sought by the United States.
lmpact Ol Agreement Disputed
However, Yeutter asserted in announcing the last-minute
deal that the new arrangements constituted "a major ac-
complishment for the President's steel program, as well as a
major step forward for trade relations between the U'S. and
the EC." The scope and duration of the agreement, he
maintained, "will preserve the integrity of the President's
steel program, which provides for voluntary restraint agree-
ments on steel shipments to the U.S. from the major steel'
producing areas of the world."
Even with the agreement with the EC, many analysts
believe that total steel imports this year will greatly exceed
the President's target of 18.5 percent of the U.S. market.
However, Administration officials said the new deal will
help to decrease the import level starting in 1986.
Commenting on this matter, Yeutter asserted that the EC
agreement "demonstrates that the Administration is firmly
committed to accomplish the goals of the President's steel
program. The Administration's original expectation on steel
imports, 18.5 percent for finished steel products and 1.7
million tons for semifinished steel, remains in effect and
will be greatly facilitated by the EC agreement."
The deal with the Europeans will now be subject to the
approval process of the Community, Administration offi-
cials said. This action will result in two arrangements-one
extending the 1982 carbon steel accord but revised to in-
clude certain additional new products as well as consulta-
tion products which were the subject of an agreement
concluded Aug. 9, and another extending the current pipe
and tube agreement. Both arrangements will run through
Sept. 30, 1989, USTR said.
During the long and difficult negotiations that led to the
agreement, the United States asked for reductions in the
eiisting levels of imports and the addition to the accord of
goods that are included in the voluntary restraint agree'
ments with other countries. The Europeans were known to
be concerned about these matters, and were said to believe
that they were being asked unfairly to shoulder a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of assisting the U.S. industry.
U.S. lndustry Criticizes Agreement
The U.S. industry, which had pressed for a considerably
tightened agreement with the EC, reacted quickly 
.and
sharply to news of the new accords. The deal, the American
Iron-and Steel Institute charged, "means that not only is the
EC not being penalized for its persistent violations of the
arrangemeniover the past two years, but.is in fact being
rewaiied for its 'unconscionable violations,' as Ambassador
Yeutter so properly characterized them in his statement
yesterday."
" AISI Chritm^n Donald Trautlein further argued in a
statement on the accord that "the lack of an agreement on
semifinished steel is also very disturbing. This news is
c
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(@ tempered somewhat by the ambassador,s statement that ttreAdministration's original expectation of semifinished steelimports of 1.7 million tons remains in effect. Because of the:
surge in European exports of semifinished steel, it is obviour;
that some prompt and decisive action is required if there ist
to be any possibility of staying within that commitment.,,
- 
Commenting on the steel relief program in general, Traut_
lein added that "it is obvious that action muit be taken by
year-end to include other significant steel-supplying couri-
tries for which no arrangements exist. It is aiso important
that the terms of all the arrangements be stricfly eniorced.
Such actions are vital for the president's program to be
effective."
Deal Satisfactory To EC
EC officials, on the other hand, said the deal was a
"workable" arrangement, and praised the efforts made by
both sides to resolve the dispute. euestioned about the
semifinished steel situation, a Community spokesman as-
serted that the Europeans did not agree to any figure, but
noted that the United States wanted a precise export limit,
an_d was prepared to impose a quota, if necessary. In Brus-
sels, EC Commissioner for External Relationj Willy de
Clercq told reporters following announcement of the deal
that the problem of semifinished exports will remain a poirrt
of contention between the two sides for some time to come.
De Clercq called the overall agreement ,,almost good
news" for the Community. He said the Europeans natuia.lly
would have preferred no limitations on their shipments, bui
added that "considering the determination of theAmerir:ans
to limit imports, it's a satisfactory result.,,
EC Plan For Ending Subsidies
Meanwhile, in related development, EC industry ministers
have agreed on a comprehensive plan that will make Com-
munity steel production dependent on market conditions
following more than four years of quotas and subsidies.
Starting Jan. 1, the quantities of coated sheet steel and
conc.rete reinforcing bars made in the EC will depend upon
market forces. The ministers also agreed to ban state subsi-
dies, with the exception of closure aid to companies that
decide to go out of the steel business, as well as subsidies for
research and development and environmental protection.
AIso last week, LTV Steel President David Hoag, noting
the recent jump in imports from the EC and otherlourcesl
called for immediate enactment of legislation to support
compliance with the President,s steel import relief- pro-
gram. He cited in particular HR 3459, which provides ihat
imports of steel products from any country which is notparty to a_ bilateral agreement under the president,s pro-
gram shall not exceed 70 percent of the amount of sieel
imported from such country during the base period Oct. 1,
1983, to Oct. 1, 1984.
-Hoag asserted that "the September import level in excessof 30 percent of the U.S. steel market is an insult to the
President, the Congress, and American workers, and vividly
demonstrates one thing-our foreign trading partners con-
ttnue to ignore the President,s eftorts to reduce the flood of
steel into this country. There is only way to effectively make
offshore producers aet responsibiy, ind that is [hrough
legislation establishing leveli of steei imports.,,
European Community lb
U.S. INCREASES DUT]ES ON EC PASTA IN PROTESTOVER BRUSSELS REFUSAL TO ENt}CIriUS OISPUTE
.,:l::iir:g States. turned down a last minute offer by rher.uropean Community to solve the citrus/pasta disput! be-
fore the U..S.-imposed deadline of Oct. 3l and substantially
increased import duties on European pasta Nov.1.
The higher duties-which naa Ueen temporarily held up
since July (2 ITR 949, July 24, 198b)-repreient an incrr:ase
from 0.5 percent ad valorem for pasta not containing egg to
40 percent. Duties on egg-containing pasta rose tolb-[er-
cent ad valorem from the normal duty of 0.2b percent,
In a statement issued Oct. 31, U.S. Trade Representative
Clayton Yeutter said, "Regrettably the EC did not table a
negotiating proposal until today, and that offer was clearly
inadequate." He called the EC response ,,extremely
disappointing."
GATT Dispute panel Decision
The United States has claimed that the EC has blocked
final acceptance of a General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade dispute panel decision rejecting special import pref-
erences for imports from the surrounding Mediterranean
countries for several months (2 ITR 898, July 10, l9g5).
In Brussels, the EC announced that the U.S. action was
unfair and said it would retaliate immediately with higher
duties of its own on U.S. exports of lemons and walnuts.
Their duties on lemons will rise from 8 percent ad valorem
to 20 percent; walnut duties would go from g percent to S0
percent.
EC Charges U.S. Responsibitity
Willy De Clercq, EC commissioner for external relations,
asserted in Brussels: "The U.S. has ... taken responsibility
for setting in motion a process that needlessly aggravates an
already tense trade situation. This escalation does not make
sense. It can only damage the two parties involved.,,
The EC official described the unilateral U.S. action as
clearly in violation of the GATT, calling it a ,,quasi-embargo
striking harshly against a Community industry particularly
important for one of our member states, Italy.,' De Clerc(
said the U.S. decision was "particularly regrettable because
it was taken despite progress made in exploratory contacts
and despite the Commission's considerable efforts to find a
reasonable and balanced solution to the citrus problem.',
De Clercq contended that the Community is unable to
meet the U.S. demands because any agreement would de-
pend on the outcome of talks now under way with certain
Mediterranean countries which are granted special trade
preferences by the European Community. Those talks could
last months, EC officials admit.
California lnterests At Stake
Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Calif), anticipating lack of action by
the deadline, charged in a Senate floor statement Oct. 2-9
that the EC has "whiled away the summer and waited until
the middle of October to obtain even the bureaucratic
mandate needed to begin negotiations on the preferential
citrus agreements with Mediterranean countries.', The bu-
reaucratic delay is Europe's problem, not Washington's,
Wilson maintained.
Wilson said the United States should counter-retaliate
against the EC if the Community chose to impose higher
duties on U.S. lemon and walnuts. California,s citrus indus-
try has lost 948 million annually to the discriminatory EC
action since the unfair trade practice was first brought to
the attention of U.S. trade officials in l9?0, according to
Wilson.
James Murphy, assistant trade representative for Europe
and the Mediterranean, reportedly flew to Brussels thrie
times in the past two weeks to head ofi a confrontation over
the dispute. On learning that the EC agreement with certain
Mediterranean countries was still some time off, he is
lnternational Trade Reporter
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un'derstood to have recommended that the Administration
impose the promised duties on European pasta efiective on
the Nov. I deadline, rather than postpone ihe action again.
EC pasta exports to the United States are valued at about
$30 million a year. Annual U.S. exports of lemons and
walnuts to the EC amount to g1 million and gB2 million,
respeetively, according to EC calculations.
Unfair Trade Practices
USTR SENDS FIRST'NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE'
TO CONGRESS LISTING OVERSEAS TRADE BARR]ERS
The U.S. Trade Representative Oct. 29 transmitted a 240-
page report on the more outstanding trade barriers to U.S.
exports of goods and services existing in some 34 countries
and the European Community.
The report was the first annual "National Trade Esti-
mates" report to Congress required under the l9g4 Trade
and Tariff Act (1 ITR 528, Oct. 31, 1984). It excludes barriers
in non-market economies.
In his accompanying letter to Senate Finance Committee
Chairman Bob Packwood (R-Ore), USTR Clayton yeutter
pointed out that some of the report's information had been
used recently to establish "priorities for specific U.S. initia-
tives." In many of the cases, consultations or other proceed-
ings have already begun under Section 301 or the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade dispute setilement mecha-
nism. "In most others, we are in some stage of bilateral
negotiations with the applicable foreign government,,, he
stated.
Much of the work will also be used by the newly created
unfair trade practices strike force in the Commerce Depart-
ment (2 ITR 1328, Oct. 23, 198b), Yeutter noted.
- 
Included in the report are evaluations of such question-
able practices involved in tariffs and other import charges;
quantitative restrictions; import licensing; customs barriers;
standards, testing, labeling, and certification procedures;
government procurement; export subsidies; lack of intellec-
tual property protection; countertrade and oftsets; services
barriers; and investment barriers, among others.
Countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-gium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, the European
Community, West Germany, Finland, France, India, Ind-one-
sia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Neth-
erlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the philippines,
Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
- 
A preface to the report emphasizes that many of the
barriers are not illegal under the GATT. Theii impact
further supports the need for another international round of
trade negotiations, Yeutter pointed out.
Drafts of the USTR report were reviewed by various
industry sector advisory committees.
__-An updated list of pending Section 301 cases issued byUSTR recently appears in the Text Section.
The plan, which was endorsed in principle the day beforeby the Senate Democratic Caucus ana wfiicn is to be intro-duced soon in the form of a bill, was apparenily put forth att,his time to enable the Democrats to seize the fiitiativ; ;;l,rade legislation. A comprehensive trade package currenlvis being p,ut together by staffers for memLers ,i tfr" d*rilI.inance Committee-almost all oJ them RepuUlcans_anJ
irs scheduled to be introduced before Thankigiving (2 nii1362; Oct. 30, 1985).
Plan Offered As ,Consensus Legislation'
In announcing the program on behalf of the Senate Demo_
cratic Working Group on Trade policy, Sen. Lloyd Bentsen(D-Texas) described the plan as ,,consensus tegisiation,,anJ
argued that it will help to begin the job of building abipartisan consensus on trade policy in the Senate. Howeier,
the move surprised some of those involved in formulating
the omnibus Senate bill and seemed to mark yet anothe?
move in the political tug-of-war between the iwo parties
over trade legislation. Both House Democrats and House
Republicans have already announced their omnibus propos-
als (2 ITR 1289, Oct. 16, 1985), and congressional obiervers
l,rave been waiting for weeks to see what would happen in
tlhe Senate.
At the same time, however, Bentsen's emphasis on bi_
partisanship and the relative similarities among the pack-
agt:s and recommendations announced to date suggesf that
Dernocrats and Republicans will be able to reach i compro-
miste when they turn their attention next year to coming up
with an omnibus trade bill.
ER
GATT Reform Urged
Among the points made by the Democratic senators was
that ttre General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should be
reformed first before it is burdened with new rules of
conduct. The Democrats noted that the Administration
wants tcl come up with rules on trade in services in the
planned new GATT round, but argued that,,GATT coverage
of services will be meaningless if we are unable to appiy
GATT rules to the subjects already covered in name only:,
such as trade in agriculture and trade with developing
countries, as well as to make the existing rules enforceable
and reciprocal."
Besides that, the trade bill planned by the Democrats will
modify a procedure enacted in 1984, so that at least 60 days
before formal trade negotiations begin, the Administration
must set out in detail what preparations it has made. By
disapproving the negotiations at this stage, Bentsen said, the
congressional trade committees "could keep for Congress
the option of amending any legislation the Administration
might eventually propose to implement agreements arising
out of such negotiations. However, if the plan were ap-
proved, the Administration would have the benefit of the
special fast track for trade legislation."
Asserting that current trade policymaking is "confused
and disorganized," the Democratic measure will also create
a National Trade Council to make trade policy "a high
national priority" and to replace the interagency commit-
tees that have grown up during the Reagan Administration.
Also planned is a National Trade Data Bank to coordinate
existing federal trade data programs and make recommen-
dations for improving the timeliness, comprehensiveness,
and utility of the existing data, the senator said.
Finally, Bentsen asserted that a study is needed of the
future of the U.S. eeonomy as it will relate to the "new
global economy" of that era. Accordingly, the bill will
(
(
Trade Policy
SENATE DEMOCRATS ISSUE LEGISLATIVE TRADE
PROGRAM, EXPRESS HOPE FOR BIPARTISAN PLAN
Arguing that the Administration has failed to establish a
coherent, effective trade policy, Senate Democrats Oct. B0
announced a five-point legislative program designed to en-
hance this country's competitive position.
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